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ABSTRACT 
 
Sidgwick famously claimed that an argument in favour of utilitarianism might be provided 
by demonstrating that a set of defensible philosophical intuitions undergird it. This paper 
focuses on those philosophical intuitions. It aims to show which specific intuitions Sidgwick 
endorsed, and to shed light on their mutual connections. It argues against many rival 
interpretations that Sidgwick maintained that six philosophical intuitions constitute the self-
evident grounds for utilitarianism, and that those intuitions appear to be specifications of a 
negative principle of universalization (according to which differential treatments must be 
based on reasonable grounds alone). In addition, this paper attempts to show how the 
intuitions function in the overall argument for utilitarianism. The suggestion is that the 
intuitions are the main positive part of the argument for the view, which includes Sidgwick's 
rejection of common-sense morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism. 
The paper concludes by arguing that some of Sidgwick's intuitions fail to meet the conditions 
for self-evidence which Sidgwick himself established and applied to the rules of common-sense 
morality.  
 
 
0. One aim of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is to provide an argument 
for utilitarianism, the view that an agent acts rightly insofar as she performs 
that action, out of the range of actions open to her, which maximizes aggregate 
happiness, hedonistically construed. He takes intuitions to be central to this 
aim. He maintains that ‘the utilitarian method…could not…be made coherent 
and harmonious without…[a] fundamental intuition’ (ME xvi-xvii), that ‘the 
only moral intuitions which sound philosophy can accept as ultimately valid are 
those which at the same time provide the only possible philosophical basis of the 
Utilitarian creed’ (PC 564), and that ‘the Intuitional method rigorously applied 
yields as its final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism, – which it 
is convenient to denote by the single word, Utilitarianism’ (ME 406-407).1 The 
                                                 
1 For the abbreviations used herein, see the bibliography of primary sources below. 
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nature and number of intuitions and the role that they play in Sidgwick’s 
argument is obscure. My purpose here is to clarify his position. In §§ 1 & 2, I 
defend an account of the nature and number of intuitions on which he relies. In 
§ 3, I attempt to make sense of how the intuitions function in the argument for 
utilitarianism. In § 4, I briefly outline some worries about the intuitions.  
 
 
1. Sidgwick subscribes to philosophical intuitionism, the view that there are ‘one 
or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident’ (ME 102). 
These principles are self-evident: a proper understanding of them is sufficient for 
justifiably believing them (ME 229). The justification of these principles is 
therefore direct or arrived at by ‘direct reflection’ on the nature of the 
propositions in question (ME 383), though no intuition is infallible (ME 211; cf. 
ME 400). He calls this position intuitional in the ‘wider sense’ because with 
other intuitional positions it shares a commitment to ‘self-evident principles 
relating to “what ought to be”’ (ME 102n1). Intuitionism in the ‘narrower 
sense’ is dogmatic intuitionism. It is committed to the existence of self-evident 
propositions which are general rules ‘implicit in the moral reasoning of ordinary 
men, who apprehend them adequately for most practical purposes’ (ME 101). 
More specifically, it claims that ‘we have the power of seeing clearly that certain 
kinds of actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from their 
consequences; – or rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences, 
from which other consequences admitted to be possibly good or bad are 
definitely excluded’ (ME 200). The kinds of actions that are right are those 
required by the rules of justice, benevolence, and veracity, among others. A 
third species of intuitionism, perceptional intuitionism, holds that we intuit the 
morality of particular actions without reliance on rules or principles (ME 100).  
Sidgwick rejects both dogmatic and perceptional intuitionism en route to his 
defense of philosophical intuitionism and utilitarianism. He does not devote 
much space to perceptional intuitionism but it is clear that he rejects it (ME 
100-101, 214). The argument contra dogmatic intuitionism is more sustained 
and more central to his endorsement of philosophical intuitionism (ME 337-
361). After an exhaustive survey of the various rules of common-sense morality 
with which the dogmatic intuitionist is concerned, he argues that we must reject 
the normative aspect of the view on the grounds that none of the rules, ‘when 
fairly contemplated, even appears to have the characteristic of a scientific 
axiom’ (ME 360). The problem is that the rules of common-sense morality are 
  
Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions 
 
 
 187
unclear, or if clear, then disputed, or in conflict with each other, and therefore 
do not satisfy the four conditions of self-evidence, which require that for a 
proposition to be self-evident it must be ‘clear and precise’, ‘ascertained by 
careful reflection’, consistent with other propositions considered self-evident, 
and disagreement regarding its truth be absent or explained away (ME 338-
342). At most, the rules of common-sense morality provide adequate guidance to 
typical people in typical circumstances. In the wake of his rejection of dogmatic 
intuition Sidgwick finds ‘certain absolute practical principles, the truth of 
which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are of too abstract 
a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by 
immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case; 
particular duties have still to be determined by some other method’ (ME 379). 
These philosophical intuitions provide ‘a rational basis for the Utilitarian 
system’, the method by which we determine our particular duties (ME 387; see 
also ME 406-407).  
Sidgwick relies on the following six philosophical intuitions.  
1.  ‘It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong 
for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, 
and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of 
the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment’ 
(ME 380). Call this intuition U.  
 
2. ‘The mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable 
ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment that [sic] to 
that of another’ (ME 381). Call this intuition T.  
 
3. ‘The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of 
view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that 
is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized 
in the one case than in the other’ (ME 382). Call this intuition P. 
 
4. ‘As a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, – so far as it is 
attainable by my efforts, – not merely at a particular part of it’ (ME 382).  Call 
this intuition B.  
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5. ‘Happiness (when explained to mean a sum of pleasures)… [is] the sole 
ultimate end’ (ME 402; see also LE 107, 128-130). Call this intuition H.  
 
6. ‘The greater quantum of pleasure is to be preferred to the less, and that ex vi 
termini the larger sum made up of less intense pleasures is the greater quantum 
of pleasure’ (LE 110; italics in original). Call this intuition M.  
 
I will now attempt to justify the contention that Sidgwick relies on six 
philosophical intuitions. He thinks U is self-evident: immediately preceding it 
he says that ‘the self-evident principle strictly stated must take some such 
negative form as this’ (ME 380).  This proposition requires unpacking. It entails 
that one be consistent in one’s moral judgements. If one claims that a certain 
act x is wrong, then one is rationally bound to claim that act y is wrong if x and 
y are identical in all their universal properties, i.e., features that may be stated 
as reasonable grounds for differentiating moral treatment or assessment. But 
what constitutes a ‘reasonable ground’ for variation in evaluative assessment? 
In discussing the intuition only unreasonable grounds appear to be discussed. 
This is not surprising: the axiom is ‘negative’, intending to ‘throw a definite 
onus probandi on the man who applies to another a treatment of which he would 
complain if applied to himself’ (ME 380). One ground that is explicitly ruled out 
as unreasonable is one that appeals to properties explicated purely in terms of 
particulars, i.e., non-generic terms.2 The intuition, it seems, is intended to rule 
out as reasonable grounds such items as numerical differences, proper names 
and indexical terms, spatial location, essential reference to individuals, and so 
on. The intuition requires consistency in one’s moral judgements with variations 
based on reasonable grounds alone, where reasonable grounds exclude non-
generic terms.3 
In his initial discussion of T Sidgwick does not say that the principle is self-
evident. Instead, he implies it by stating that T is another ‘principle’ 
epistemologically analogous to U (ME 380-381). But only two pages later he 
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Michael Smith, “Does the Evaluative Supervene 
on the Natural?,” Well-being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, eds., Roger 
Crisp and Brad Hooker (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 91-114, esp. 97-101, & J. L. Mackie, 
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), 83-102. 
3 This intuition does not fill this notion out completely, however. This may leave Sidgwick 
open to the charge that this intuition is not clear and precise, though see below for more on 
this.  
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confirms that he holds that T is self-evident (ME 383). T and the other 
intuitions attempt to build on U. Each specifies further both ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘reasonable’ grounds for varying one’s moral judgements. In an early paper 
Sidgwick confirms this. ‘The essence of Justice or Equity, in so far as it is 
absolutely obligatory, is that different individuals are not to be treated 
differently, except on grounds of universal application: which grounds, again, 
are given in the principle of Rational Benevolence’ (UG 31). T expresses the idea 
that location in time is not directly or intrinsically relevant to the value of a 
state of affairs or experience.4 T requires that agents remain rationally 
indifferent to when benefits and burdens occur. Sidgwick provides what look 
like several different versions of T, e.g., that ‘I ought not to prefer a present 
lesser good to a future greater good’ (ME 383) and that ‘a smaller present good 
is not to be preferred to a greater future good’ (ME 381), though these remain 
consistent with T. 
P is described as a ‘self-evident principle’ (ME 382) and B is characterized as 
‘evident’ and as a ‘rational’ intuition (ME 382) and as self-evident (ME 383). P 
and B give expression to some of the central features of utilitarianism. The 
general upshot of accepting them is that to whom a benefit or burden accrues is 
not directly significant to the morality or rationality of action. P is designed to 
nudge us towards this position by abstracting from one’s own identity and 
adopting the point of view of no one in particular. From this viewpoint – the 
‘point of view…of the universe’, as he calls it – we notice that each person has a 
good but that no one person’s good is of more importance than another person’s 
good. In taking up this point of view Sidgwick finds it self-evident that no one 
person’s good satisfies what we might call a ‘uniqueness condition’, a condition 
the satisfaction of which would make it special and therefore more intrinsically 
important than another person’s good. The exclusive role of P in the 
establishment of utilitarianism is that it opens up the possibility for a radically 
impartial theory of rational action, though it is important to point out that P 
presupposes that it is possible to compare the goods of individuals as against 
each other. Sidgwick explicitly states that the only legitimate ground for giving 
one person’s good more attention is if that good happens to be greater than 
                                                 
4 A factor, that is, independent of the quantity of goodness under consideration. For example, 
if x and y are of equal goodness in terms of their quantity, then other things being equal we 
ought rationally to have equal regard for them, despite the fact that the occurrence of x takes 
place at time t while y takes place at time t+ 1 year. 
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others in the class of all those being compared, and this implies comparability of 
the good and hence the possibility of aggregating goods both interpersonally 
and intrapersonally.  
What is not implied by P is anything about how rational beings are required 
to act. From the fact that when viewed from the point of view of the universe it 
is possible to compare goods across individuals and to discover that no one’s 
good is any more important than another’s, it does not follow that we should be 
impartial as regards individual goods or that we should promote the good 
impartially construed. It is possible to grant that my good is of no more 
importance than another’s, but hold that rationally speaking we have only to 
promote our own good on the whole. Similarly, it is possible to grant the claim 
about the possibility of comparability, of commensurability and of aggregation, 
but hold that rationally speaking we have only to promote our own good on the 
whole. This is, I think, something Sidgwick would accept, since for him the real 
debate between the egoist and the utilitarian turns on whether reasons are 
agent-relative rather than agent-neutral or vice versa (ME 420). This is what 
makes B key to the debate between rational egoism and utilitarianism, and it is 
clear that he regards is as such (ME 387-388, 500).5 B represents the agent-
neutrality that is at the very heart of utilitarian moral theories. It claims that 
the fact that something is good gives anyone and hence everyone a reason to 
desire or promote it. The mere fact that an act (or whatever) advances the good 
gives anyone a reason to do it.  
Sidgwick thinks that a maxim of benevolence follows from P and B. As he 
puts it: ‘from these two rational intuitions we may deduce, as a necessary 
inference, the maxim of Benevolence in an abstract form: viz. that each one is 
morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, 
except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less 
certainly knowable or attainable by him’ (ME 382). The precise manner in 
which this proposition follows from P and B is unclear. The claim that one 
ought to regard the good of another as much as one’s own is misleading, for 
what happens when one does not have any regard for one’s own good? It is 
better to construe the inference as stating that one is bound to maximize the 
good no matter whose it happens to be, since his view is that we do find 
something of value from the point of view of the universe. This makes it 
                                                 
5Rational egoism is the view that an agent is rational insofar as he seeks to maximize his own 
happiness, hedonistically construed (ME 95, 121). 
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consistent with B, which enjoins promotion of the general good rather than 
enjoining parity in treatment between oneself and others. The inference from P 
and B could be stated as follows: as a rational being I am bound to aim at good 
generally unless there is some sort of non-arbitrary reason not to do so. That is, 
I am bound to aim at good generally unless someone’s or a group’s good satisfies 
something like the uniqueness condition. From the point of view of the universe 
it appears self-evident that no one person’s good is of any more importance than 
another person’s, other things being equal. Therefore, from a denial of the fact 
that anything satisfies a uniqueness condition together with the claim that I 
have reason to aim at the good generally, it follows that I am morally bound to 
aim at the good, agent-neutrally construed.  
Why does Sidgwick call this a necessary inference? The only real change 
between B and it is (at least in the way I have construed it) in the use of the 
phrase ‘as a rational being I am bound’ in B and the use of the phrase ‘each one 
is morally bound’ in the necessary deduction. This is a necessary inference 
because for him “rationally bound” is synonymous with “morally bound” (ME 
375, 34-35). Shortly after completing his account of U, T, P, B and the 
deduction, Sidgwick maintains that he has arrived, ‘in my search for really clear 
and certain ethical intuitions, at the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism’ 
(ME 387). But as he notes this is not quite accurate, since ‘to make this 
transition logically complete, we require to interpret “Universal Good” as 
“Universal Happiness”’ (ME 388).  
It is not obvious that H is self-evident. At best U, T, P, and B together 
establish some sort of maximizing consequentialism.6 However, Sidgwick’s 
remarks indicate that he wants to establish utilitarianism using the intuitional 
method, not just maximizing consequentialism (ME xvi-xx, 387, 388, 406-407, 
UG 31-33, PC 564). If we are to take this claim seriously, we need to consider 
whether or not he actually thinks there is an intuition pertaining to the ultimate 
good. Without such an intuition it seems that we cannot make sense of his claim 
to have established utilitarianism by the intuitive method. 
In defending his claim that happiness is the only thing good in itself, 
Sidgwick asks that ‘the reader…use the same twofold procedure that I before 
requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of 
common moral precepts’ (ME 400). The twofold process involves both an appeal 
                                                 
6 J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977), 304.    
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to ‘intuitive judgement [of the reflective intellect] after due consideration of the 
question when placed fairly before it’ and ‘a comprehensive comparison of the 
ordinary judgements of mankind’ (ME 400; see also LE 127).7 As regards the 
first procedure Sidgwick states that upon ‘sober’ reflection in, as Butler says, ‘a 
cool hour’, he arrives at the following intuition: ‘we can only justify to ourselves 
the importance that we attach to any of these objects [‘Virtue, Truth, Beauty, 
Freedom’ (ME 400)] by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to 
the happiness of sentient beings’ (ME 401). Elsewhere Sidgwick is more explicit: 
‘My own answer to the question…Why is the ultimate good and criterion held 
to be pleasure? is, that nothing but pleasure appears to the reflective mind to be 
good in itself, without reference to an ulterior end; and in particular, reflection 
on the notion of the most esteemed qualities of character and conduct shows 
that they contain an implicit reference to some other and further good’ (LE 
107). Furthermore, he says that he appeals to intuition to ‘justify my own view 
that it is Pleasure alone, desirable Feeling, that is ultimately and intrinsically 
good’ (LE 126). The intuition appears to be that happiness which consists in 
pleasure defined as ‘a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at 
least implicitly apprehended as desirable or – in cases of comparison – 
preferable’ (ME 127; see also ME 131, LE 130) is the sole ultimate good.8 That 
he thinks he has obtained an intuition with respect to the ultimate good 
explains (a) why he thinks that the intuitional method when rigorously applied 
                                                 
7He is not here trying to justify his account of ultimate good by reference to common sense 
itself. He says that his aim is to ‘bring Common Sense to this admission [namely]…that 
Happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically Good or Desirable’ (ME 421n1; italics 
added). This may not always have been the case. In an early discussion he argues that to 
establish his view of ultimate good he appeals to ‘the immediate intuition of reflective 
persons; and…to the results of a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgements of 
mankind’ (UG 35). Here he contends that the argument from ordinary judgements ‘comes in 
rather by way of confirmation of the first’ (UG 35), suggesting that he thinks the ordinary-
judgements argument confirms the intuitive one. In the final edition of ME, however, he 
drops the claim about confirmation, which suggests that he changed his mind on this point 
(see also LE 128). Whatever the case may be, in both cases it looks like he is employing the 
intuitional method (at least in part) to arrive at an account of ultimate good. For an account 
of Sidgwick’s attitude toward the epistemological status of common-sense morality, see 
Anthony Skelton, “Schultz’s Sidgwick,” Utilitas 19 (2007), 91-103. 
8 It is not obvious what Sidgwick means by pleasure. The passage quoted in the text is just 
one of the accounts of pleasure he provides. For others, see ME 94; 93 & 120-121; & 402. He 
appears to favour the account quoted in the text; see LE 130, ME 398. 
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leads to utilitarianism and (b) his frequent appeals to intuitive reflection in his 
discussion of the nature of the ultimate good.  
Of course Sidgwick nowhere declares explicitly that H it is self-evident. He 
argues only that he relies on the intuitional method to arrive at H. But his only 
account of what the intuitional method comprises suggests that he holds that H 
is self-evident. Recall his account of an intuition: ‘by calling any affirmation as 
to the rightness or wrongness of actions “intuitive,” I do not mean to prejudge 
the question as to its ultimate validity, when philosophically considered: I only 
mean that its truth is apparently known immediately, and not as the result of 
reasoning’ (ME 211; see also PC 564). If this is a basic feature of the intuitional 
method, then we may conclude that Sidgwick arrives at his account of the 
ultimate good in the same way that he arrives at his other intuitions, by direct 
reflection on the proposition in question. My suggestion is confirmed by his only 
other explicit discussion of the relationship between hedonism and intuitionism 
(ME 98). He claims that hedonism is authoritative just in case happiness, 
hedonistically construed, is the ultimate reason for action. This claim is not 
known by induction from experience in the way Mill might have thought. 
Rather, if the claim that pleasure is the only reasonable ultimate end of human 
action ‘is legitimately affirmed in respect either of private or of general 
happiness, it must either be immediately known to be true, – and therefore, we 
may say, a moral intuition – or be inferred ultimately from premises which 
include at least one such moral intuition; hence either species of Hedonism, 
regarded from the point of view primarily taken in this treatise, might be 
legitimately said to be in a certain sense “intuitional”’ (ME 98).9 Since he does 
not infer his own account of ultimate value from premises it must be the case 
that he thinks it is known by intuition, hence he thinks it is self-evident that the 
good is happiness, hedonistically construed, for a moral proposition is a moral 
intuition only if it is self-evident.  
Sidgwick thinks he arrives at a maximizing version of utilitarianism (ME 
411). It is not made explicit how he gets maximization out of his intuitions. His 
thought might be that doing less than the maximum would result in aiming at 
only part of the good. By doing less than the maximum one would be aiming 
merely at a particular part of the good rather than at good generally. However, 
it looks like Sidgwick gets maximization in another way. He does not claim 
explicitly that we ought to maximize the good. Instead, he seems to think that 
                                                 
9 He is referring here to the wider sense of intuitional; see ME 98n2. 
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if ‘it be granted that pleasure as the end is made up of elements capable of 
quantitative comparison’, then it is ‘self-evident’ that M (LE 110). Together B, 
H and M require that we aim at maximal happiness or pleasure agent-neutrally 
construed. 
 
 
2. I have argued that Sidgwick relies on six philosophical intuitions in his 
argument for utilitarianism. In this section I argue against rival interpretations. 
In The Theory of Good an Evil, Hastings Rashdall suggests that Sidgwick 
relies on three philosophical intuitions.10 He maintains that Sidgwick holds it 
self-evident that ‘I ought to promote my own good on the whole (where no one 
else’s good is affected), that I ought to regard a larger good for society in general 
as of more intrinsic value than a smaller good, and that one man’s good is (other 
things being equal) of as much intrinsic value as any other man’s.’11 He calls 
these prudence, rational benevolence and equity. He misses U, T, M and H. He 
might be forgiven for missing H, but not for missing the others, which are 
clearly labeled self-evident.12 Sidgwick does not in ME state that Rashdall’s 
‘prudence’ is self-evident. At best such a requirement falls out of the 
requirement to advance the aggregate good in a case where one finds oneself 
marooned on an uninhabited desert island. Rashdall must be confusing 
‘prudence’ with T.13 His rational benevolence and equity resemble B and P and 
the necessary inference discussed above. Nevertheless, he misses the key element 
of B, namely, that we ought to aim at good generally rather than at merely a 
particular part of the good: he gives the intuition an axiological, rather than 
                                                 
10 Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I (Oxford: University Press, 1907), 
90-91, 147, & 184-185.  
11 Rashdall, 90-91.  
12 Rashdall is aware that a claim like H relies on intuition for justification. He believes that 
Sidgwick relies on intuition to justify something like H, though he does not seem to think 
that Sidgwick thinks that H is self-evident and therefore on the same level as the three other 
self-evident intuitions that Rashdall lists. See Ethics (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913), 22, 
and see also Is Conscience an Emotion? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), 43.  
13 Or, he may be misled by Sidgwick’s sometimes sloppy account of his intuitions; see ME 
391-392, FC 483.  
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deontic gloss.14 The deduction is not itself self-evident; it is deduced from self-
evident propositions.  
J. B. Schneewind agrees that Sidgwick endorses U, T, P and B.15 He misses 
M. He argues that Sidgwick gets maximization from ‘the definitions of rightness 
and goodness.’16 This is untrue. First, Sidgwick claims that ‘right’ is not 
definable (ME 32, 32-33, FC 480). Second, he holds that ‘good’ is definable, but 
in his definition he does not mention the idea of maximization (ME 112). Third, 
he is keen to ensure that definitions of key moral terms (e.g., right and ought) 
remain neutral with respect to substantive moral questions (FC 480-483, ME 
109). Therefore, he is unlikely to be warm to the idea of getting maximization 
from definitions of central moral and axiological notions.  
Schneewind’s point might be understood in another way. When he refers to 
‘definitions’ he might be referring to the way in which B connects the right and 
the good.17 He claims that what demonstrates that maximal goodness is what 
makes acts right is ‘the negative result of the examination of common-sense 
morality, that none of the purely factual properties of acts can serve as an 
ultimate right-making characteristic. It cannot, therefore, be the case that some 
factual properties of acts make them right…it must rather be the case that 
bringing about the most good is what makes right acts right.’18 This is difficult 
to swallow. One might grant the results of the negative argument against 
common-sense morality and that the good is the ultimate-right making 
characteristic as per Schneewind’s account of the intuitions, but deny that it is 
maximal goodness that is the ultimate right-making characteristic. It is still the 
case that from B one needs an argument or something analogous to get one to 
the claim that we ought to maximize the good, rather than simply promote it to 
some degree. Indeed, Sidgwick seems required to run an argument analogous to 
                                                 
14 Rashdall discusses Sidgwick’s intuitions again in Ethics, where he gives rational 
benevolence a deontological gloss; see Ethics, 62. In the same place, however, he construes 
prudence as the claim that ‘I ought to promote my own greater good rather than my own 
lesser good’ and rational benevolence as the claim that ‘I ought to promote the greatest good 
on the whole’ (62). As noted, Sidgwick does not defend prudence in ME, and these two 
intuitions sometimes conflict.  
15 Schneewind, 296. For a similar account of Sidgwick’s intuitions, see Robert Shaver, 
Rational Egoism (Cambridge: University Press, 1999), 61-62, 74.  
16 Schneewind, 307. 
17 I owe this suggestion to Robert Shaver. 
18 Schneewind, 308. 
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the one he runs against common-sense moral rules against rivals of the 
maximizing conception of rationality.  
On the face of it, Schneewind does not think that Sidgwick endorses an 
intuition pertaining to the ultimate good. Officially, his position appears to be 
that Sidgwick embraces only U, T, P and B.19 This is not satisfactory. This 
would leave the view of the ultimate good undefended in ME, and it is not 
consistent with his defense of his account of ultimate good elsewhere (e.g., LE 
107, 126ff.). Sidgwick also maintains that the justification of a claim like H is 
either inferential (i.e., inferred from a set of propositions which include at least 
one intuition) or intuitive (ME 98). It appears not to be inferred from any set of 
propositions which include at least one intuition; therefore, it must be justified 
by reference to intuition.  
Schneewind appears to suggest that he believes this. He claims that although 
in Book III, chapter XIV of ME Sidgwick maintains that there is no self-
evident principle ‘enabling us to connect ultimate good out of all relation to 
consciousness with human action’20 and he is ‘not appealing to an additional 
intuition to exclude the intrinsic goodness of things or states of affairs out of 
relation to all consciousness, but is asserting only that he finds no self-evident 
practical principle asserting their goodness’, he does defend the ‘utilitarian 
principle’.21 By this he means that Sidgwick has ‘not just one axiom – that 
pleasure is intrinsically good – but as many self-evident propositions as there are 
experiences of pleasure.’22 In his case, Schneewind’s position is that there are the 
four intuitions that he explicitly notes, plus an intuition pertaining to the good, 
namely, that pleasure is intrinsically good, plus as many as there are experiences 
of pleasure.23 This is problematic. First, this conflicts with Schneewind’s 
interpretive requirement that ‘it seems sensible to try to find the smallest 
number of axioms with which the work to be done by first principles can be 
done.’24 Second, when Sidgwick discusses the intuitive argument for his account 
of the ultimate good he refers to pleasure as he defines it as being the only thing 
                                                 
19 Schneewind, 290.  
20 Schneewind, 325. 
21 Schneewind, 326.  
22 Schneewind, 320.  
23 Schneewind provides no argument for the general claim about the value of pleasure, which 
leads me to believe that he does not think that there is such an intuition. His focus is entirely 
on showing that claims about the value of particular pleasures are self-evident.  
24 Schneewind, 290.  
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that is ultimately good or to the claim that all and only the happiness, 
hedonistically construed, of sentient beings possesses ultimate goodness (e.g., 
LE 107, 126ff., ME 402, 398). He does not say that certain particular feelings 
are themselves self-evidently desirable. He seems to think that the general 
claims about pleasure or happiness are self-evident.25 Schneewind is misled here 
by Sidgwick’s view of pleasure. The latter defines pleasure as ‘a feeling which, 
when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as 
desirable or – in cases of comparison – preferable’ (ME 127). It seems that 
Schneewind believes that the variety of apprehension mentioned here is 
intuitive in nature. The position is that each feeling of the sort that Sidgwick 
picks out is intuitively known by the one experiencing it to be desirable or 
intrinsically valuable. He appears at times to use apprehension in this way (ME 
383). However, it is not obvious from anything he says that he intends to use it 
in this way in his definition of pleasure. The fact that one’s apprehension of the 
desirability of certain feelings is not likely to be arrived on the basis of 
understanding alone and the fact that Sidgwick believes that non-human 
animals can experience pleasure indicates that he does not intend to use the 
term this way.26  
J.M.E. McTaggart argues that Sidgwick produces five intuitions.27 Unlike other 
commentators, McTaggart is aware that Sidgwick has an intuition resembling 
H, though he provides no argument for this.28 My argument above vindicates 
his assertion. However, he holds that there is another axiological intuition, that 
‘nothing…is good as an end except some state of a conscious being; and nothing 
is good as a means except as tending to bring about some state of a conscious 
being.’29 There is some evidence that this is Sidgwick’s view. At the conclusion 
of his discussion of the notion ‘good’ he says that ‘we can find nothing that, on 
                                                 
25 Robert Shaver has suggested to me that the claim about particular pleasures may simply 
be an application of the general claim that pleasure is intrinsically valuable. In this case, 
however, it would be mistaken to think that claims about particular pleasures are axioms 
rather than derivations from an axiom and this cannot be Schneewind’s view because he 
contends that the particular episodes of pleasure meet the tests that Sidgwick applies to self-
evident intuitions (Schneewind, 319).   
26 For the claim about animals, see ME 414.  
27 J. Ellis McTaggart, “The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick,” Quarterly Review 205 (1906), 398-419.  
28 For the same, see William Frankena, “Sidgwick, Henry,” An Encyclopedia of Morals, ed., 
Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 539-544, 542.  
29 McTaggart, 407.   
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reflection, appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human 
existence, or at least to some consciousness or feeling’ (ME 113; see also LE 124). 
Sidgwick often uses the language of reflection in his discussion of the intuitions 
above (see, e.g., ME 383). This seems to indicate that we should interpret him as 
holding this intuition. But in the case of the above intuitions in general and in 
the case of H in particular he says that he relies on intuition or that they are 
self-evident; he does not say this with respect to the claim that McTaggart refers 
to. He seems instead to treat this claim as a lemma in his argument for the 
proposition that happiness (hedonistically construed) is the sole ultimate good 
(ME 398). Moreover, since he raises objections to it, it is best to see him as 
holding that it does not qualify as an intuition.  
McTaggart also maintains that Sidgwick thinks that it is self-evident that ‘we 
ought to prefer the good to the bad.’30 He lists no evidence that Sidgwick thinks 
this, and it seems more likely that Sidgwick thinks that it is part of the 
definition of good that we ought to seek it, and that it is part of the definition of 
bad that we ought not to seek it. Indeed, he defines ‘ultimate good on the whole’ 
as ‘what as a rational being I should desire and seek to realize, assuming myself 
to have an equal concern for all existence’ (ME 112; italics in original). 
McTaggart misses some of the other intuitions (e.g., P and M). Most surprising 
is the fact that he misses U. Sidgwick holds that U is self-evident. Immediately 
preceding U the following words appear: ‘the self-evident principle strictly 
stated must take some such negative form as this’ (ME 380). It may be that 
McTaggart is misled by the fact that Sidgwick is not entirely explicit about the 
status of this requirement. He sometimes treats U as a logical requirement built 
into the meaning of moral terms, and perhaps McTaggart’s belief is that this is 
Sidgwick’s considered view.  
In one of his main discussions of meta-ethics Sidgwick claims that terms like 
‘ought’ and ‘right’ and their cognates are ‘too elementary to admit of any 
formal definition’ (ME 32; see also FC 480-483). The only method by which to 
clarify the fundamental notion is ‘by determining as precisely as possible its 
relation to other notions with which it is connected in ordinary thought’ (ME 
33). One ‘notion’ with which these terms are connected (and with which they 
are liable to be ‘confounded’) is the following. ‘When a moral judgement relates 
primarily to some particular action we commonly regard it as applicable to any 
other action belonging to a certain definable class: so that the moral truth 
                                                 
30 McTaggart, 408.  
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apprehended is implicitly conceived to be intrinsically universal, though 
particular in our first apprehension of it’ (ME 34).31 Although he maintains that 
this notion is intimately connected with ‘ought’ judgements he does not claim 
that the notion or requirement is built into the meaning of the term and its 
cognates. Indeed, he argues that these latter terms are not definable. This 
suggests that he is not a proponent of the logical thesis that universality is part 
of the meaning of moral judgements. This is further confirmed by his 
suggestion, when discussing the principle elsewhere, that the requirement of 
universality is ‘implied in the common notion of “fairness” or “equity”’ (ME 
380), a substantive normative principle.32 In addition, he treats this principle in 
the same way that he treats the other self-evident intuitions, namely, as 
requirements of rationality (ME 386-387).  
There is some evidence, however, that he holds that it is a logical requirement 
contained in the meaning of moral notions. In his discussion of dogmatic 
intuitionism he claims that the following is obtained by merely ‘reflecting on the 
general notion of rightness’ (ME 208). ‘We cannot judge an action to be right for 
A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two 
some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in 
their duties’ (ME 209). His remark that he finds this principle by reflecting on 
the notion of rightness suggests that he believes the requirement to be one of 
logic. But this is a little too quick. In the discussion mentioned in the last 
paragraph he says that the requirement of universality is ‘connected in ordinary 
thought’ with terms like ‘right’ and ‘ought’ despite not being part of the 
definition of these terms. In his later discussion he refers to the notion of 
rightness as ‘commonly conceived’. This suggests that, although the 
requirement is found in the notion of rightness ‘as commonly conceived’, it is 
not strictly speaking part of the meaning of the term ‘right’ or ‘ought’. This is, I 
think, the best way to reconcile his later comments with those discussed above. 
Finally, Sidgwick explicitly states that he wants to arrive at ‘self-evident moral 
principles of real significance’ (ME 379), not merely tautologies or ‘sham-
axioms’ (ME 374). This gives us a strong reason to think that he does not intend 
the principle as a logical thesis, but as a self-evident principle.  
                                                 
31 This resembles his final articulation of U; he explicitly connects the two at ME 208n2. 
32 By ‘implied in’ he does not mean built into the meanings of the term; see ME 386. 
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A.R. Lacey argues that Sidgwick espouses seven intuitions.33 His account of 
the intuitions is close to mine, though he, too, misses M and H. He mistakenly 
lists the necessary inference as an intuition.34 He lists U, but he thinks that 
there are further intuitions with respect to justice in ME. According to Lacey, 
Sidgwick holds that the following two claims are self-evident. ‘If a kind of 
conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for some one else, 
it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, other than 
the fact that I and he are different persons’ and that we ought to exhibit 
‘Impartiality in the application of general rules’.35 Sidgwick discusses both of 
these requirements. As regards the first, he says that it is ‘widely recognized’, 
but after raising objections to it and some other similar accounts he says that 
the self-evident principle ‘strictly stated’ is U. The others are either imprecise or 
applications and he accepts U in part because it is precise (ME 380). Of the 
second requirement, Sidgwick does say that there ‘appeared to be no other 
element which could be intuitively known with perfect clearness and certainty’ 
(ME 380). The key word here is ‘appeared’. It may be the case that it appeared 
to be that there was no other element which could be known intuitively, but 
Sidgwick’s view seems to be that the appearance is illusory, since he claims that 
there are no self-evident propositions to be found in common-sense morality 
(ME 360). At best, the requirement is another formulation of U.   
Some further matters need to be dealt with. T is often regarded as the basis 
for rational egoism.36 However, as T stands here it is consistent with both 
rational egoism and utilitarianism.37 The intuition does not tell one whether or 
                                                 
33A. R. Lacey, “Sidgwick’s Ethical Maxims,” Philosophy 34 (1959), 217-228. For a similar 
account of Sidgwick’s intuitions with some of the same errors, see C. D. Broad, Five Types of 
Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, 1930), 223-227. 
34 Lacey, 219. It may be that Rashdall, McTaggart, Lacey and others are mislead on this 
score by previous editions of ME, where Sidgwick lists the ‘necessary inference’ found in ME 
as an intuition (see ME2 355, ME3 381-382, ME4 382). This mistake is also found in F. H. 
Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901), 110. 
Hayward notes that Sidgwick endorses T and U.  
35 Lacey, 218.  
36Schneewind, 362, and Bernard Williams, “The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and 
the Ambitions of Ethics,” Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), 
153-171, 160-161. 
37 For this point, see Georg von Gizycki’s review of ME4, International Journal of Ethics 1 
(1890), 120-121. See also Shaver, 75, Schneewind, 361, and Hastings Rashdall, “Professor 
Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism,” Mind 10 (1885), 200-226, esp. 202, and ME 414.  
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not one should give greater regard to one’s own good on the whole than the good 
on the whole of others.38  
But Sidgwick is not always careful. He claims at one point that prudence, ‘so 
far as…[it is] self-evident, may be stated as…[a precept] to seek…one’s own 
good on the whole, repressing all seductive impulses prompting to undue 
preference of particular goods’ (ME 391-392). There are three reasons for 
thinking that his considered view is that only T is self-evident. First, he could 
not have intended to argue for something that would lead to egoism in his 
discussion of T, for this directly contradicts his claim that the intuitions he 
discusses in ME (U, T, P, B and H) provide a ‘rational basis’ for utilitarianism, 
not both utilitarianism and egoism (ME 387). If the intuition is supposed to 
refer not only to T but also to the essential features of rational egoism, these 
claims about establishing utilitarianism are baffling at best. Second, by his own 
account, he did not attempt to establish the truth of egoism in the first three 
editions of ME (FC 484). However, starting in the second and third editions T 
and some other intuitions that pertain to utilitarianism are present (ME2 354, 
ME3 380-381). If the intuition did prove rational egoism, he could not say that 
he provided no argument for it in the second and third editions. Sidgwick does 
say in ME3 and ME4 that T is the ‘principle on which…Rational Egoism is 
based’ (ME3 388, ME4 386-387). But he noticed that this conflicted with his 
claim not to be providing a basis for the view. Hence, in subsequent editions he 
stated very clearly that T is merely ‘implied in’ rational egoism (ME 386). It is 
not there providing a ‘rational basis’ for egoism in the way that B provides (or 
appears to provide) a rational basis for utilitarianism (ME 387).39 Third, when 
he does turn to a discussion of what the basis of rational egoism might be, he 
does not refer to T. Instead, he contends that the ‘rationality of Egoism is based 
[on]…the assumption…that the distinction between any one individual and any 
other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I” am concerned with the 
quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in 
which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals’ 
(FC 484; see also ME 498). He declares that this proposition is the ‘self-evident’ 
intuition ‘upon which the rationality of Egoism is based’ (FC 484).  
                                                 
38 Indeed, even the practical manifestation of the principle is agnostic as to whether 
individual or aggregate good is to be promoted. 
39 For this point, see Shaver, 76. 
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It is important to note here that Sidgwick may be construed as producing a 
seventh intuition in his discussion of the basis of rational egoism. I dissent from 
this construal. First, Sidgwick does not declare that the above proposition is 
self-evident in ME (ME 498). Second, there is good reason for this and hence 
good reason for thinking that this is not a seventh intuition. This intuition 
appears to fail the clarity and distinctness test. It runs the idea of separateness 
of individuals together with the claim about its role in our thoughts about what 
we have most reason to do. Precision requires separating various ideas from 
each other and this putative intuition does not achieve this.40 It might be that 
in ME Sidgwick means to connect the claim about separateness with reasons for 
action. This seems problematic. The passage states that the second claim follows 
from the first but this is not an obvious or necessary truth, for while there may 
be cases where this is true, there are well known counter-examples. Mother 
Teresa might well have noted that she is a separate individual with a set of 
projects and commitments that drove only her as any agent, but that she was 
not concerned with her own good in a way that was fundamentally more 
important and different than her concern for others. It is also not obvious just 
how fundamental the unconcern for others is that follows from the distinctness. 
I might be concerned with myself in a way more fundamental than the way I 
am concerned with you but still hold that I have at times a duty to help others, 
for example, where the cost to me is negligible and the benefit to you is great. I 
might think that for the most part I am concerned for myself but not entirely. 
If this proposition is to pass the test and get us to rational egoism it has to 
construe ‘fundamental’ in the strongest possible sense. But this is unclear from 
the way the proposition is stated. In light of these problems and the fact that he 
does not declare that this claim is self-evident in ME, it seems best to think that 
Sidgwick’s considered view is that there is not a seventh philosophical intuition.  
 
 
3. My aim to this point has been to outline the philosophical intuitions on which 
Sidgwick relies in his argument for utilitarianism. But how does he demonstrate 
the truth of utilitarianism by reliance on the intuitions? Nowhere is any kind of 
deduction or argument from the intuitions as premises to utilitarianism as a 
conclusion provided. In this section I provide a schematic statement of how the 
                                                 
40 A ‘distinct notion of any object…[is] one that is not liable to be confounded with that of 
any different object’ (LK 449). 
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intuitions figure into the argument for utilitarianism. The best way to see the 
role that the intuitions play in his argument is to situate them in the general 
structure of ME. The intuitive argument for utilitarianism forms one part of the 
argument for the view, which includes a negative argument contra common-
sense morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism, the 
main features of which are found in Book III, chapter XI, the appeal to 
philosophical intuitions, which takes place primarily in Book III, chapters XIII 
& XIV, and a Millian-style proof, which is supplied in Book IV, chapters II & 
III.41  
Had Sidgwick attempted an explicit argument, it might have looked as 
follows: 
P1. As a rational being I am bound by the basic requirements of reason. 
P2. The basic, ultimate requirements of reason direct one to do either what is 
based on what is right without reliance on all of the consequences that flow from 
what one is doing or on what is good without restriction (ME 2-3, 391, UG 27-
28, OHE 6-7).  
P3. It is not the case that the basic requirements of reason direct one to do what 
is right without reliance on all of the consequences that flow from what one is 
doing (ME 337-361). Instead, the morality of common sense is at best ‘perfectly 
adequate to give practical guidance to common people in common 
circumstances’ (ME 361). 42  
C1. Therefore, as a rational being I am bound to regard what is good without 
restriction (ME 391). 
P4. Variation of treatment of individuals must be based on reasonable grounds 
alone, where this is considered to exclude non-generic grounds (ME 380). (This is 
U.) 
P5. It is not reasonable to regard the time at which the good occurs as directly 
(or intrinsically) relevant to its value (ME 381). (This is T.)  
P6. It is not reasonable to regard to whom the good accrues as directly (or 
intrinsically) relevant to the rationality of an action (ME 382; see also UG 31). 
Instead, one is required to advance the good, agent-neutrally construed. (This is 
a combination of P and B.) 
                                                 
41 For more on the nature of the Millian proof, see Henry Sidgwick, “The Establishment of 
Ethical First Principles,” Mind 4 (1879), 106-111.  
42This is the conclusion of the negative argument against common-sense morality and 
dogmatic intuitionism.  
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P7. ‘Happiness (when explained to mean a sum of pleasures)…[is] the sole 
ultimate end’ (ME 402; see also LE 107), where pleasure is defined as ‘a feeling 
which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended 
as desirable or – in cases of comparison – preferable’ (ME 127; see also ME 131, 
LE 130). (This is H.) 
P8. ‘It is self-evident that the greater quantum of pleasure is to be preferred to 
the less, and that ex vi termini the larger sum made up of less intense pleasures is 
the greater quantum of pleasure’ (LE 110; italics in original). (This is M.) 
C2. Therefore, I, as a rational being, am morally bound to advance to a 
maximum degree happiness, agent-neutrally and temporally neutrally 
construed.  
P9. If a method of ethics embodies or gives the best or most reasonable 
expression of these ultimate requirements of reason or intuitions, then it is true. 
P10. Utilitarianism is the only method of ethics (that we know of) that 
embodies or is the best expression of these intuitions. 
C3. Therefore, utilitarianism is the only method of ethics or rational procedure 
by which I determine what I ought to do. 
C4. Therefore, as a rational being I am bound by the dictates of utilitarianism.  
This seems a reasonable summary of the main argument for utilitarianism in 
ME, and of how the intuitions function in the argument. The intuitions provide 
epistemic justification for utilitarianism and emerge in the context of an 
argument against the claim that there are self-evident intuitions within 
common-sense morality, and this argument is supplemented by the Millian-style 
proof of Book IV, chapters I & II.  
 
 
4. As I mentioned above, Sidgwick rejects the claim that the main rules of 
common-sense morality (e.g., justice, good faith, veracity and purity) are 
properly characterized as self-evident. Instead, his view is that ‘such rules…are 
only valid so far as their observance is conducive to the general happiness’ (ME 
8). His main criticism is that the rules of common-sense morality fail his tests 
for self-evidence (discussed in § I) (ME 338-342). Broadly speaking, he argues 
that ‘so long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague generalities…we are 
disposed to yield them unquestioning assent…But as soon as we attempt to give 
them the definiteness which science requires, we find that we cannot do this 
without abandoning the universality of acceptance’ (ME 342). Sidgwick is very 
scrupulous when examining the putative intuitions of rivals; however, he is 
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much less than rigorous when it comes to demonstrating that his own intuitions 
satisfy the conditions for self-evidence. In this section, I briefly outline how 
some of his intuitions appear to fail the tests.  
If we apply the clarity and precision and disagreement tests to Sidgwick’s 
intuitions we do indeed find difficulties. In his discussion of U he does not define 
what we he means by a ‘reasonable’ ground for difference of treatment. The 
notion admits of several different interpretations, and although I have tried to 
clarify it, it is not clear or precise from examining U alone that all rational 
inquirers will agree on how to understand the notion of ‘reasonable’ or what is 
implied by it. If one examines B, one finds Sidgwick arguing that we ought to 
aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part of it. One might agree to 
this claim when it is put in this way. However, disagreement might emerge 
because rational inquirers have different views about how we ought to aim at 
the good. Some rational inquirers may well agree to B but only when it is 
accepted that the only appropriate way to aim at the good is directly rather 
than indirectly; other rational inquirers may agree to B but only when it is 
assumed that it is permissible to aim at the good directly and/or indirectly 
depending on what various empirical calculations dictate. Or one may agree to 
B when the good is left unspecified but reject it when the good is understood to 
consist in happiness or pleasure or some other good. Similar problems can be 
pointed out for P and various renditions of T where the notion of good is also 
left unspecified. T refers to the notion of consciousness. One might agree to T if 
consciousness is meant to include only higher-order consciousness, such as 
virtuous intending, intellectual activities, and the contemplation of beauty, but 
not if it is meant to include in addition all pleasure, feelings or emotions that do 
not require a kind of higher-order awareness or consciousness.   
By far the most controversial intuition is H. It is not always manifest what 
Sidgwick believes is self-evident. Is it self-evident that pleasure is the sole 
ultimate good or is it self-evident that happiness hedonistically construed is the 
sole ultimate good? The difference between these two is that in the first case it is 
pleasure that is intrinsically valuable and in the second case it is happiness that 
is intrinsically valuable and then argued to consist in pleasure. It seems that it is 
the second claim, but Sidgwick does not properly distinguish between the two. 
One might agree to the second claim as it is presented in H, but disagree when 
pleasure is defined in the way that Sidgwick suggests, as ‘a feeling which, when 
experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable 
  
ANTHONY SKELTON 
 206
or – in cases of comparison – preferable’ (ME 127; see also ME 131, LE 130). Or, 
one might even agree to the account of pleasure just given but only because one 
interprets ‘intelligent beings’ in a certain way. What is meant by an ‘intelligent 
being’? Is this notion meant to include more than fully developed adult 
humans? If not, then certain individuals may agree with Sidgwick’s claim. But 
if so, then others may disagree. At times, he substitutes ‘sentient’ for 
‘intelligent’ in his definition of pleasure (ME 131, 398). This suggests that he 
means to include more than simply fully developed adult human beings, and 
this may lead some to agree to Sidgwick’s claim but it may lead to some 
disagreeing, especially those who are loath to grant non-human animals moral 
standing.   
Sidgwick, of course, notes that there is deep disagreement about some of his 
intuitions. He is in fact all too willing to note that the rational egoist rejects P 
and B and that he cannot convince the egoist of utilitarianism using the Millian-
style of proof (ME 420). He ends the work with the dualism of practical reason: 
both rational egoism and utilitarianism present themselves as equally 
reasonable though conflicting requirements of reason. This conclusion raises a 
worry about how Sidgwick understands the relationship between disagreement 
and his philosophical intuitions. He seems to suggest that where there is 
disagreement and where we ‘have no more reason to suspect error in the other 
mind than in my own’, then ‘reflective comparison between the two judgements 
necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of neutrality’ (ME 342). If this is 
the case, then why is he not reduced to a state of neutrality with respect to the 
intuitions that play a role in the justification of utilitarianism? This seems the 
more reasonable position to advocate than a dualism of practical reason, the 
generation of which relies on maintaining the truth of utilitarianism and the 
intuitions that undergird it. Sidgwick is therefore unclear on just what to do in 
light of disagreement, and to the extent that he is unclear his argument against 
dogmatic intuitionism is weakened.43  
Sidgwick does not deal well with disagreement in other cases. For example, he 
is aware that many reject his theory of value (ME 401, LE 126). However, in 
                                                 
43 Sidgwick is also unclear as to what the clarity and precision test demands. He appears to 
fault common-sense morality and dogmatic intuitionism for not producing clear and precise 
practical directives. However, he notes that his own intuitions fail to tell us what to do in 
particular cases and that they do not give us complete practical guidance (ME 379, 380). He 
does not claim that they are impugned as a result. This seems unfair to the proponents of 
common-sense morality and dogmatic intuitionism.  
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addressing T. H. Green’s criticisms of his view, for instance, his tactic is to 
rearticulate his arguments for H and to raise several objections to Green’s own 
view. Is this sufficient to show that he has more reason to suspect error in 
Green’s mind than in his own? If this is what Sidgwick has in mind, then it is 
something that he needs to explain better. In his defense of the view of the good 
in ME he addresses worries that might be raised by adherents of common-sense 
morality (ME 402ff.), and he employs arguments to show how certain ideal 
goods (truth, freedom, virtue, and so on) might be understood from a happiness 
theorist’s point of view. But all this shows is that the happiness theorist may be 
able to make some sense of these rival values; it does not demonstrate that the 
dissenters are wrong. It is not clear how this might explain away the dissent or 
show that Sidgwick has more reason to suspect error in the mind of his 
opponent than his own.  
Adherents of Sidgwick’s intuitive argument for utilitarianism will need to 
both clarify his intuitions and respond to critics of them if it is to be acceptable. 
It will not do to simply state without explanation, as Rashdall does in his 
endorsement of some of Sidgwick’s intuitions, that they ‘possess the clearness 
and definiteness and freedom from self-contradiction which other alleged 
intuitions so conspicuously lack.’44 
 
 
5. Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism involves appeal to a number of 
philosophical intuitions. The nature and number of such intuitions is a matter of 
scholarly dispute. I have argued that he appeals to six philosophical intuitions 
in attempting to justify utilitarianism. This appeal is part of his general 
argument for utilitarianism which includes both a negative argument against 
common-sense morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic 
intuitionism, and a Millian-style proof which attempts to convince critics of 
utilitarianism by reliance on views that they already accept. His argument will 
not be acceptable until the philosophical intuitions receive further clarification 
and defense. In particular, Sidgwick and those inclined to defend his argument 
for utilitarianism must demonstrate that the intuitions themselves meet the 
requirements that he suggests all self-evident propositions must meet if they are 
                                                 
44 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, I, 90.  
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to function as premises ‘that lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions’ (ME 
338).45 
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